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ABSTRACT  
 
Through case study research this paper illustrates opportunities presented by IT-based technological 
change in British retail bank markets (1985-1995). For the managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland IT 
appeared to lower entry barriers, exit barriers and deliver high sustainability of competitive advantage. 
The strategic intent behind diversification patterns of the Royal Bank of Scotland suggested 
competitive considerations were at a premium because unsolicited take-over bids in the early 1980s put 
pressure on managers to create growth opportunities. Direct Line Insurance was a subsidiary from the 
Royal Bank of Scotland. Direct Line was also the first retail finance institution to establish a clear 
competitive advantage based on information technology. The success of Direct Line enabled an 
increase in the market share of British retail financial services of The Royal Bank of Scotland. Direct 
Line is a case of planned success that questions the extent to which banks’ competencies must change 
to master alternative delivery channels. The success of Direct Line also suggested more effective 
execution than other activities explored by managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 Direct Line Insurance was the first retail finance institution to establish a clear 
competitive advantage based on information technology (IT). From no established 
base Direct Line grew to be the biggest direct motor insurer ever in the UK (DL, 
1995b). Moreover, the success of Direct Line enabled an increase in the market share 
of British retail financial services of The Royal Bank of Scotland. Elements of Direct 
Line's performance depict how companies assimilated the use of information systems 
over time and highlight the dynamics of how:  
 
"Actions designed to exploit certain elements of the [market’s] structure will, 
in the process, transform the structure.” (Geroski, 1991:158).  
 
 Direct Line is a case of planned success which questions the extent to which 
banks’ competencies must change to master alternative delivery channels. Success 
emerged from a visionary strategy that redefined barriers to enter bank markets and in 
particular, the distribution of retail insurance products. Direct Line built success 
around selling motor insurance directly over the telephone to selected market 
segments. In the process, Direct Line was able to profit from fee income (i.e. premium 
of insurance underwriting) and a flat and flexible organisational structure.  
 The discussion is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of 
the history and characteristics of telephone-based retail financial services. Section 3 
illustrates a brief history of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and how it addressed 
technological change. Also discussed is the context in which the bank explored 
opportunities in bankassurance through a phone-driven subsidiary. Section 4 presents 
the history of Direct Line Insurance. Section 5 discusses the origins of Direct Line’s 
success. In section 6 the discussion summarises how technical change (i.e. telephone-
based operations) modified growth opportunities in bank markets and how technical 
change altered the stability of the environment, increased competitive pressures and 
questioned whether bank managers had control of core capabilities.  
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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BANKING 
The Importance of Non-branch-based Delivery Systems  
 The most important consequence of the drive towards mass delivery of retail 
financial services has been that banks effectively moved from decentralised personal 
relationships to institutional managers1. Starting in the late 1970s, banks began to 
create relationship databases instead of using skilled personnel at all points of contact 
with customers (BBC, 30-IX-1995). For example, Lesley Taylor (Head of Direct 
Banking, Royal Bank of Scotland) claimed that current technology allowed one 
person to develop in 3 or 4 weeks the skills that previously required 5 years in the job 
(BBC, 30-IX-95. See further Morris, 1986:97). IT applications, therefore, promised 
higher organisational flexibility to those banks that could effectively implement 
technical changes.  
 The second result of technical innovations that redefined banks' business 
approach related to distribution capabilities. The branch network reduced its 
importance as the point-of-sale for financial services. New distribution channels were 
created such as electronic point of sale terminals (EFTPOS), telephone transfer 
systems and smart cards. However, not all substitutes of the bank branch enjoyed the 
same success. For example, growth of the most sophisticated gadgets was hampered 
by conflicts between retailers and banks as to the inadequacy of cash and cheques. 
Also, as to who should receive the "lion's share" of the profit. As a result by the end of 
the 1980s, EFTPOS had not turned into a major new source of profit for banks' fee 
income (Wood, 1989:3; and Channon, 1988:317). 
 Nevertheless, new distribution channels allowed banks to supply more services 
and this had dramatic effects in banks' cost structures. For example, Bauer (1995:94) 
claims that by emphasising IT systems Citibank (New York) was able to serve 85% of 
its customers by telephone and electronically. For Citibank, automation represented 
lowering the overall cost rate from 70% to 55% with announced reductions of 30% in 
branch staff costs (idem p.95). Changing from more to less expensive distribution 
channels was possible because the same information or transaction could be delivered 
in a number of ways. However, cheaper processes were an insufficient condition for 
reduced cost structures. For instance, providing an account's balance costs less 
                                                 
1With the effect that “The banker as a man of stature had been lost.” (Senior Executive. Lloyds Bank 
Group, 3-III-1995). 
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through an ATM than at the teller. But only if the total volume of requested balances 
remains unchanged will the total cost of ATM-supplied balances be less than that 
provided through branches. Technology, therefore, opened the way for banks to 
improve their cost structures provided customers changed their behaviour according 
to banks' expectations.  
 
Telephone-Based Delivery of Retail Financial Services 
 Perhaps the most successful new delivery channels for financial services were 
telephone banking operations. Telephone banking evolved to complement ATM 
networks and physical branches and thus, created a multi-channel distribution system 
for banks based on an integrated customer account and information system (Gardener, 
1995:4). 
 Distributing retail financial services through the telephone was unsuccessfully 
pioneered in 1979 by Banc One Corp. of Ohio, USA (Myers-Kanter, 1989:3). Despite 
Bank One’s experience, phone-banking pilot schemes continued and by 1982 
telephone transfer systems were operational in a small number of Californian banks 
(Channon, 1986:387). In 1984, Sanwa Bank (Japan) received 40% of deposits and 
performed 70% of card transactions through full on-line banking services (idem, p. 
312). At that time, Sanwa was also developing push-button phone interfaces (op.cit.).  
 In 1986, The Bank of Scotland and Nottingham Building Society jointly 
introduced the first major telephone banking system in Britain (Hughes, 1994:36). 
The system (called HOBS) aimed at home and office banking. HOBS was swiftly 
followed by TSB’s Speedlink system in 1987. A more advanced version of these 
systems was developed in October 1989, when Midland Bank established a 24-hour 
telephone service under the separate identity of First Direct. This was the first British 
telephone-based, branch-less retail bank.  
 Since 1989, the proportion of transactions over the phone has growth to a 
considerable share of total transactions. In the US, transactions represented 24% of 
total transactions in 1995 (Financial Times, 3-V-95). Customers in European 
countries prefer other means of distribution to engage in retail finance services as in 
1995 telephone-based transactions represented 4% of total transaction sin the UK, 3% 
in Sweden, 2% in Germany and 1.5% in France (idem). 
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 In spite of international differences to embrace IT applications, the success of 
new distribution channels consistently undermined an important barrier to entry into 
banking, that is, the branch network. Banks realised that the innovation presented a 
threat because branches were no longer required for either processing (as it moved to 
regional processing centres) or customer contact. The result of technical innovation 
was that the same branch had potentially become a sunk cost. Technological 
innovation forced bank managers to face the fact that a vast branch web was a 
disadvantage for the future and rationalisation was necessary. The challenge for bank 
managers was startling because in the UK the last rationalisation process began with 
the amalgamations of the 1870s. Since then, British banks consistently increased the 
number of home and overseas outlets. However, 9% of UK branches disappeared 
between 1968 and 1980 (Morris, 1986:85), and approximately 2,000 or 13% of the 
total were shut between 1987 and 1992 (Morgan et al., 1995:93). In brief, the fact that 
access to a branch network ceased to be a entry barrier into retail banking meant that 
telephone-based operations (with its low cost structure) could source a financial 
competitive advantage to new entrants. 
 
Analysis Framework for Telephone Banking Applications 
 Table 1 illustrates four types of interactions to describe the way in which retail 
banks and customers can interact over the telephone. According to Baldock (1994) 
most banks in the UK adopted the first way of interaction (person to person) or 
created two separate banking operations (person to person and computer to person). 
The type of application adopted was based on how managers wished to grapple with 
two important characteristics of telephone-based services. First, services offered in 
the person-to-computer system were mainly high volume, standardised and relatively 
costly through the decentralised traditional platform (transactions such as balance 
inquiries, transfer between current account and investments, etc.)  Secondly, those 
services that required more sophisticated responses and/or complete information were 
placed in the person-to-person system. 
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Table 1: Types of Interaction in Telephone-Based Retail Finance 
 Bank Interface 
Customer 
Interface 
 Person  Computer 
 
Person 
The user speaks 
directly to the bank 
representative. 
The user interacts with a 
voice recognition unit or 
uses a tone pad. 
 
Computer  
Computer managed 
access to required 
service specialist. 
A computer or smart 
phone interacts directly 
with the bank's 
computer system. 
           Source: Baldock (1994), Channon (1996), author. 
 
 The underlying assumption of the person to person and computer to person  
approach to telephone banking seemed to be that the human being remained the best 
machine to handle scripted queries. Using persons as final interface also allowed 
keeping the system's growth opportunities (i.e. architecture) open while the number of 
options for interaction was computer managed. Under this strategy advisers take 
customers through a guided conversation (put on the screen by the bank's system) 
and, in doing so, advisers retrieve all the information the bank actually needs to 
complete the customers' request through on-screen forms. Advisers don't need to 
know why certain data is vital, only that they need to follow screen driven protocol 
(Lesley Taylor, in BBC, 30-IX-95). The system’s growth opportunities remain open 
because system administrators can modify the interaction at will and without the need 
of major expenditures to retain or retrain the workforce. 
 In summary, IT applications and especially telephone banking offered 
possibilities to banks to achieve high organisational flexibility and cost efficiency. 
Since banks did not control the technology, telephone banking also opened the 
possibility for new entrants to contest bank markets while, at the same time, banks' 
"traditional" distribution channel became a sunk cost. The discussion that follows 
presents these arguments in greater detail by illustrating how a UK bank diversified 
across product markets and entered retail insurance markets through a telephone-
based subsidiary.  
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THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND 
Origins and Growth   
 When the Scottish colony of Darien, Panama failed in 1699, many lives were lost 
and one-quarter of Scotland's liquid assets were lost2. Scottish resentment was 
directed against England since the latter had withdrawn its support and in 1707, when 
the Scottish and English Parliaments were joined, England agreed to pay Scotland a 
pecuniary "Equivalent" in compensation for Darien and other losses and debts. Only a 
fraction of the sum could be paid in cash and debentures were issued. The holders of 
these became members of the Equivalent Company, to which a banking charter was 
awarded in 1727. Under the name of The Royal Bank of Scotland a second charter 
was secured in 1738. Besides allowing an increase in capital, the charter guaranteed 
the bank's life after the debentures were redeemed.  
 Initially, The Royal Bank of Scotland did not establish any branches at all but 
developed correspondent relationships. This strategy was to change in 1783 when the 
first branch opened to serve tobacco importers and distributors in Glasgow. The Royal 
Bank of Scotland then pursued the amalgamation process that swept through British 
banking and specific actions of this strategy included (see further Ellis, 1987 and 
RBS, 1993):  
 
• Acquisition of Western Bank accelerates branch growth in Scotland (1857). 
• First retail branch in London (1874). 
• Purchase interest in Glyn, Mills & Co. (1905). 
• Acquisition of Drummonds Bank accelerates branch growth in England (1924). 
• Acquisition of William Deacon’s Bank provides access to London Clearing House 
(1930). 
• Amalgamation with The National Commercial Bank of Scotland provides further 
branch growth in British isles (1969). 
                                                 
2 This section borrows freely from RBS (1993). 
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• National and Commercial Banking Group is formed, that is, a holding company to 
control Royal Bank of Scotland, Glyn, Mills & Co. and William Deacon’s Bank 
(1969). 
• Merger of Glyn, Mills & Co., William Deacon's Bank and The National Bank into 
Williams & Glyn's Bank, that is, a single franchise in the London Clearing House 
(1970). 
• Full merger with Williams & Glyn's Bank and The Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
is formed (1985). 
   
  As a result of acquisitions and its own growth, the bank developed a network of 
retail branches throughout England, Wales and Scotland. A very important element of 
the geographic growth was that The Royal held a stake in Glyn, Mills & Co., since 
early in the century and gained control of it in the 1970s. As a result of a stock market 
merger (in 1985), The Royal’s branch network grew to some 860 outlets, 540 of 
which were in Scotland and 320 distributed between England and Wales (Ellis, 
1987:24). 
 During the 1970s, business north of the border flourished as The Royal Bank of 
Scotland engaged in lending activities for businesses dealing with North Sea oil and 
gas. At the same time, overseas interests developed. For instance, merchant banking 
activities were established in Singapore and Indonesia; branches opened in New York 
and Hong Kong; and representative offices in Houston, San Francisco, Chicago and 
Los Angeles were opened. 
 At the end of the 1970s, what was to become The Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
had approximately 40% of the Scottish banking market, 15 to 20 percent of England's 
North West region and 4 to 5% of the total UK market (Hoschka, 1993:229). 
However the growth potential of its main market was sombre, as the Scottish 
population had been slowly decreasing3. This together with internal problems created 
strong pressures to find new growth opportunities.   
 
                                                 
3 From 1985 to 1993 the  Scottish population fell from 9.1 to 8.8% of the UK total (as documented in 
Nielsen, 1994). During that same period, averaged weekly expenditure per person was £107.75 sterling 
in Scotland or 4.24% below the English average of £112.32 sterling (idem.). 
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Lack of Growth Opportunities and Faile Take-over Attempts 
 At the end of 1979, Lloyds Bank had accumulated a 16.4% stake in the capital of 
the National and Commercial Banking Group (The Royal Bank of Scotland’s parent 
company). National and Commercial and Lloyds had joint control of an international 
factoring company called Lloyds and Scottish Plc (each held about 40% of the stock), 
and Lloyds made a merger approach to acquire the National and Commercial Group. 
The Scottish Board preferred to enter discussions with Standard Chartered Bank 
(another British bank with strong overseas business). After these discussions were 
made public in 1981, the Chinese Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
made a bid which was referred to the Monopolies and Merger Commission (MMC), 
who, in turn, decided that neither bid was in public interest (The Banker, 01-VI-1986, 
p. 10).  
 The contest for The Royal Bank of Scotland came at a time when major 
rationalisations were affecting many of Scotland’s financial institutions. The Board of 
The Royal played a “Scottish” card in arranging a defence and thus, evoked a Scottish 
named successor. As a result, The Royal Bank of Scotland successfully rejected the 
takeover and its managers were more fortunate than those at other Scottish companies 
such as Coats Patons, Anderson Strathclyde, North British Steel, United Wire or 
Disullen (see further The Herald, 23-IX-93). 
 After the failed take-over episode, The Royal's manager had an incentive to 
change the course of the company because the bank was still vulnerable to a take 
over. Within months of MMC's ruling a new corporate strategy was announced and 
this new strategy characterised by: 
 
• Amalgamations .- Acquisition of all the capital of Williams & Glyn's Bank in 
1985.  
• Merchant banking activities .-Through the acquisition of Charterhouse Group in 
1985. 
• Bankassurance .- Managers explored motor insurance through Direct Line 
Insurance (1985), established a joint venture with Scottish Equitable to sell life 
assurance through RBS branches (1990), and developed advisory services within 
the established branch network through Royal Bank Insurance Consultants (1991). 
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• Cross-border growth .-  Managers positioned Citizens Bank (US subsidiary) as the 
largest commercial bank in the North East of the USA (1988). 
• Cross-border alliance .- Managers take actions to make future hostile bids more 
difficult by share exchange with Banco Santander (1988). 
 
 The strategy initiated in 1985 received renewed strength when in 1989, the Rt. 
Hon. George Younger was appointed to the Board of the Group. His career had been 
in politics and government, culminating as Secretary of State for Scotland. Lord 
Younger was named Chairman of the bank in 1990. Shortly after, he and his 
management team engaged in a new major drive to carry out strategic change and 
improve the bank’s performance. The new strategy sought to achieve competitive 
advantage in retail finance through bankassurance, growth in the US, use of IT to gain 
critical mass in selected markets and an agreement with Banco Santander. The new 
strategic focus together with bad debts in the early 1990s' recession were responsible 
for merchant banking activities (under the form of Charterhouse Group) to be sold in 
1993, and staff reduced by 4,400 for the whole group (or 22% less than those in 
1991). As a result, the bank’s strategic focus emerged with an emphasis on retail, 
corporate and personal banking. 
 The Royal Bank of Scotland was then able to regain its competitive positioning. 
In the fiscal-year 1994 the bank achieved a 52.2% cost-income ratio. Even though 
accounting information included the effects of Direct Line, the bank's cost-income 
ratio was one of the lowest ratios in the UK bank sector (Financial Times, 1-XII-95). 
In 1994, profits before tax reached £532 million, a record high in The Royal's 267 
year history (RBS, 1994). In 1995, The Royal Bank of Scotland had assets of over 
£49 billion which made it number 101 in the world and Britain's sixth largest (RBS, 
1995). The bank employed approximately 20,000 persons and had 720 branches, in 
more or less equal numbers on each side of the Scottish-English border. 
 
Geographical Diversification and the Agreement with Banco Santander 
 In the 1980s, The Royal followed other British banks and established operations 
in the USA. In 1988 the bank acquired and made Citizens Financial Group a wholly-
owned subsidiary. This Rhode Island-based group offered retail banking services in 
New England. Through Citizen, The Royal Bank of Scotland became one of the few 
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British banks to have a successful diversification into the US (The Sunday Times, 5-
IX-93). However, and in response to the mid-1990s pressure for consolidation in US 
banking, Bank of Ireland approached the Royal Bank with a view to merge Citizens 
Financial with Bank of Ireland's First New Hampshire. The merger aimed to:  
 
“...enable both banks a stronger presence and forgo selling to one of the larger 
New England banks.” (Financial Times, 1-XII-95).  
 
 Shortly after, both US banks amalgamated (to trade under the Citizens Financial 
name) into a $14.4 billion dollar company (see further The Times, 19-XII-96). The 
Royal would hold a controlling interest or a 76.5% of the capital, and at the time, this 
move created the third largest commercial bank in New England. 
 In the 1980s The Royal Bank of Scotland’s international banking presence in 
Europe was practically non-existent and limited to branches in Piraeus (Greece) and 
Zürich (Switzerland) to handle their shipping business (RBS, 1993b). Its international 
presence was limited to branches in New York and Hong Kong, and representative 
offices in major cities (Singapore, Jakarta, Houston, San Francisco and Los Angeles). 
To further increase their international assets, the bank considered opening 
representative offices, branches abroad, acquiring a foreign bank or engaging in a 
strategic alliance (Hoschka, 1993:229). Foreign direct investment was discarded as 
too costly in terms of shareholder value (idem). Instead an alliance took place with 
Spain's then fourth largest bank. Banco Santander became The Royal's biggest 
shareholder by increasing its stake to 10 percent in 1988. In a corresponding 
transaction, The Royal received 2.5% of Santander's stock (RBS, 1989). See figure 1.    
 The alliance allowed The Royal's managers to pursue the geographical 
diversification move initiated in 1985 because the alliance established the well-
capitalised Santander to stand by as "white knight" to prevent another hostile bid. As 
a result of the alliance a joint bank was established in Gibraltar to provide off-shore 
facilities and serve expatriates. The Royal also took 50% interest in some of 
Santander's private banking subsidiaries in Belgium and Germany (see further 
Hoschka, 1993:323). In 1990 the private banking portfolio increased when both 
partners gained control of the Portuguese Banco de Comerçio e Industria. 
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Figure 1: Stakeholder Map of Strategic Alliance, 1995 
IBOS
1990
Royal Bank of
Scotland
1727
Banco Santander
(Spain)
1857
Banco de Comercio
e Industria
(Portugal)
Bank of Gibraltar
(UK)
1988
CC Bank
(Germany)
Credit du Nord
Belge
(Belgium)
Linea Directa
Aseguradora
(Spain)
1994
Vista Capital de
Expansion
(Spain)
1990
Bankinter
(Spain)
Direct Line
Insurance
1985
Charter House
(sold 1993)
Goldman
Sachs
EDS
(1990)
(1988)
2.5%     (1988)
10%     (1988)
(1988)
(1988)
31.7% 31.7%
31.7%
(1994)
31.7% (1994)
IT Outsourcing
(1995)
50%
50%
50%50%100%
(1993)
(1985)
 
Source: Annual Reports, author.    
Key:  (X)  = Year of acquisition.  
   X    = Year of establishment.  
   %     = Percent stake in financial capital. 
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 In spite of these deals to reinforce the original strategic rationale, the alliance did 
not open a route to higher growth diversification into the private or corporate banking 
sector. Banco Santander concentrated on international corporate banking by 
increasing Banco Santander de Negocios’ market share in Spain, Latin America and 
particularly  Asian emerging markets such as the Philippines, rather than on its joint 
private and corporate banking activities with The Royal in Europe. However, the 
Royal-Santander alliance had important collaboration in the retail finance sector. In 
1990 Santander and Royal Bank of Scotland launched IBOS (Inter Bank On-Line 
System) in an attempt to develop an independent pan-European system for retail 
banking transactions (more below). 
  
Information Technology at the Royal Bank of Scotland 
 A major product of the 1988 cross-share agreement between The Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Banco Santander was the creation of IBOS. However, IBOS was another 
in a number of IT innovations of The Royal Bank (see further Fincham et al., 1994). 
These innovations included managing own and second party ATM networks to 
develop one of the busiest cash dispenser networks in the world (RBS, 1993). The 
bank also used its IT expertise to generate handling fees for third party credit card 
processing (a system called RoyNet). As a result, selected IT innovations of The 
Royal Bank of Scotland in the 1970 to 1990 period also included: 
 
• First British bank to put its branch network direct (on-line) with a central 
computer (1973). 
• ATM network begins at Williams and Glyn's Bank (1974). 
• RoyNet – System for credit card transaction handling services (1985). 
• RoyLine – Desktop banking system for businesses (1987). 
 
 IBOS was launched by The Royal Bank and Banco Santander with the aim of 
becoming the nucleus of a Pan-European retail banking system and to provide fast, 
reliable and cheap, small cross-border transactions. The initial strategic goal of IBOS 
was to capture the retail market in cross-border transactions. This consisted primarily 
of transactions from wealthy individuals, small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
partners claimed that IBOS aimed to go beyond a link between data processing 
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systems or a cross-border enlargement of ATM networks and thus, contest other 
cross-border payment systems.  
 The system allowed money transfers between customer accounts within 24 hours, 
versus the 7 day lag for other European banks not involved in SWIFT or American 
Express transfers. The system had a £1 million daily limit for money transfers abroad 
(£3,000 when initiated abroad) and £10,000 for standing orders. The system also 
allowed customers to check their balance at a foreign (member) bank, at a cost to the 
customer of £1.00 sterling.  
 IBOS extended membership to other European banks including Crédit 
Commerciale de France and Banco de Comerçio e Industria (Portugal) in 1992. 
However, The Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander held major stock 
interests in these banks as well as in some of those that subscribed from Belgium, 
Germany and Gibraltar.  
 A major turning point was when Chase Manhattan Bank (US) subscribed to IBOS 
during the last quarter of 1995. The entry of the latter underlined the way IBOS 
provided a vehicle for small, low IT-investment banks to develop international retail 
payment capabilities that matched previously capital intensive scale international 
networks. IBOS then became a credible alternative to other interbank data exchange 
systems such as SWIFT (a Belgium-based consortium established in 1977) or 
Citibank's £200 million network. By skipping other cross-border payment systems 
IBOS could deliver low cost and reliable cross-border retail financial services. It 
offered an alternative channel to access opportunities in Europe, without requiring 
further spending by banks' shareholders. Global coverage became the objective of the 
IBOS partners as EDS, a US-based IT developer and outsourcing firm, purchased 
31.7% and turned into the managing partner (1994).  
 However, after the last reorganisation IBOS's growth rate stalled. EDS was keen 
to open the network to other banks but existing members wanted to keep it exclusive 
and as a source of differentiation and (potential) competitive advantage. In what 
follows the discussion presents greater detail on how The Royal gained a competitive 
edge in UK banking markets. But rather than gaining it through IBOS, The Royal 
gained competitive advantage through a subsidiary called Direct Line Insurance. 
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DIRECT LINE INSURANCE   
Scope of Bankassurance at The Royal Bank of Scotland 
 The first European bank to make a direct challenge to insurance companies was 
Britain's  Trustee Saving Bank in 1967 (Hoschka, 1993:13). The Royal Bank of 
Scotland and many other European banks followed this diversification path as they 
sought to capitalise on cross-selling opportunities to the existing customer base.   
 The scope of The Royal's business in bankassurance was not limited to motor 
insurance. Bankassurance included a joint venture with Scottish Equitable Life 
Assurance Society. This was called Royal Scottish Assurance and sold life insurance 
products through the branches of The Royal Bank of Scotland from 1990 onwards. 
Another subsidiary aiming to increase cross-selling opportunities was an independent 
adviser (Royal Bank Insurance Consultants). This firm was established in 1991 to 
supply general insurance to both individuals and corporations. 
 On the other hand, in 1985 The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Insurance Co Ltd 
was established and subsequently renamed Direct Line in 1988, this was one of the 
insurance subsidiaries of The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS, 1993b). Its original aim 
was to sell motor insurance over the telephone. The subsidiary started with 63 
employees and £20 million capital provided by the Royal Bank of Scotland (increased 
in stages to £155 million in 1993 in the form of subordinate debt with no recourse to 
Royal Bank of Scotland.)  
 
Direct Line "...was the first insurance company to use the telephone as its 
primary sales tool. Cutting out middlemen and commissions by selling 
insurance direct to the public.” (DL, 1995b). 
 
 By 1985 British financial circles had observed the performance of branch-less 
intermediaries (Girobank, established in 1968) and were aware of the possibilities 
offered by phone-banking (pioneered in 1979 by US banks). However, contrary to 
previous North American and British experiences Direct Line's business and margin 
rose rapidly between 1987 and 1994. In November 1994, 2.2 million motor policies 
were in force. At the time, Direct Line employed 2,857 persons (around 10% of the 
parent company). Growth from scratch to these numbers positioned Direct Line as the 
largest-ever personal motor insurance company in the UK (DL, 1994). See figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Stakeholder Map for Direct Line Insurance, 1995 
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Key : (X) = Year of acquisition (capital structure and organisation in 1995). 
   X   = Year of establishment. 
   %    = Percent stake in financial capital. 
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Growth in Business Portfolio (from Motor Insurance to Pension Funds) 
 By mid-1993 Direct Line's overall strategy had captured approximately 10% of 
the motor insurance market. Direct Line had overtaken all the composites and was the 
most successful motor cover provider. The growth of Direct Line in terms of regional 
centres and product lines included creditor insurance (1986), house contents insurance 
(1988), personal non-secured loans (1989), mortgage loans (1993), its own car repair 
centre (1994), income protection insurance (1995) and life (term) insurance (1995). 
This growth illustrates how Direct Line diversified from motor insurance to banking 
services like savings and deposit taking (for the latter a license was granted in 1995 
for operations in 1996 and was initially used to sell investment funds). 
 Geographic growth of the business portfolio built from a south London location 
(1985) towards Glasgow (1989), Manchester (1990), Birmingham (1992), Leeds 
(1994), Bristol (1995) and a joint venture in Madrid (1995). Geographic growth 
suggests that even though IT applications and telephone distribution gave Direct Line 
the possibility of national operations right from the start, managers decided to 
concentrate in selected markets (Senior Manager, 30-IX-96). Careful selection of 
geographic and product market growth used the brand name as key point for the firm 
to diversify products within the retail financial services markets. Growth at Direct 
Line leveraged on extensive use of marketing, accumulated experience and customer 
goodwill in a strategy that emphasised high levels of cross selling to established 
customers (see further Geroski, 1991:163). The strategy, however, was not invariably 
successful. Extensions to mortgages and credit insurance had mixed results because 
their start up phase took longer to achieve critical mass than motor insurance. An 
important element, in this product market move, was whether to inherit on-going 
businesses from The Royal Bank of Scotland as these portfolios contained more 
variety that Direct Line’s motor business: 
 
"The mortgage book for the bank and Direct Line was completely separate and 
continues to be. There was no cannibalism and the same applies to savings 
deposits." (Senior Manager of RBS, 26-IX-96). 
 
 Synergy and market positioning were the reason why separate franchises were 
kept  and which allowed  Direct Line to generate its own businesses because: 
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"When Direct Line Financial services was created there was not risk to 
cannibalise. The bank had a small market share (about 4%) [of mortgages and 
credit insurance markets], so Direct Line had 96% of the market to grow. 
Second, as a group we expected to acquire more customers than through any 
single one institution." (Senior Manager of DL, 30-IX-96). 
 
 As a result, managers at Direct Line used the bank’s business as a source of 
information to design their databases. Once operational, managers tried to keep 
separate and distinct activities. The decision to keep separate databases emerged from 
The Royal's management board and aimed to focus each subsidiary on its core 
markets and core capabilities rather than a single institution attempting to establish a 
single sales force, that cross-sells all products to all market segments. Succinctly, 
managers of The Royal aimed to keep organisational flexibility while they aimed to 
capture cost efficiency and integrate subsidiaries around strategic objectives. 
 
STRATEGY FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE  
Financial Performance of  Direct Line Insurance 
 The success of Direct Line has been attributed to the result of four distinctive 
forces (financial performance, innovative IT applications, focused marketing and 
quality service), of which financial performance was the most important. Three 
factors created superior financial performance, namely the expense ratio, pricing 
policies and retention rates and the financial investment strategy. The expense ratio 
fell below 16% by 1993, establishing the lowest cost  ratio among the providers of 
retail insurance. 
 Data in table 2 suggests that Direct Line's low total expense ratios resulted from 
growth of substantial scale economies emerging from its IT-based platform rather 
than from a labour-based platform (Channon, 1993:2). Direct Line was able to 
increase income and business volume without increasing labour costs (and 
particularly between 1992 and 1993). As a result, between 1989 and 1995 business 
volume grew at an average annual rate of 31%, while total expenses grew only at an 
average of 25% per annum. This produced a steadily increased margin and a declining 
cost ratio. 
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Table 2: Relative Financial Performance of Direct Line, 1989-1993 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Average 
Total Expense 
Ratio 
 
Direct Line 30.15% 31.15% 26.21% 20.97% 13.77% 24.45% 
Agency Writers 29.50% 29.50% 29.90% 30.20% 29.70% 29.80% 
Direct Writers 21.50% 21.90% 22.50% 22.50% 22.40% 22.20% 
Claims to 
Premium 
 
Direct Line 65.50% 68.84% 71.85% 74.04% 66.77% 69.40% 
Agency Writers 78.50% 78.80% 79.00% 85.00% 78.30% 79.90% 
Direct Writers 86.30% 86.60% 83.70% 91.70% 80.90% 85.80% 
  
            Source: Breaking the Mould (16-VII-94), author. 
 
 The second element of Direct Line’s financial performance was its combination 
of pricing policies and retention rates. “Instant insurance”  (i.e. insurance cover 
provided over the telephone and without agents), saved Direct Line’s customers up to 
20 percent on premium. But to translate "instant insurance" into superior financial 
performance, Direct Line required a very high retention rate. This was evident when 
in 1993 Direct Line achieved an 85.8% year-to-year customer retention ratio. For that 
same year, the sector’s average retention rate was between 50 and 60 percent 
(Marketing Week, 25-III-94). 
 On the other hand, Direct Line's proceeds from investment income was seldom 
mentioned as a feature of the company's successful financial performance. As can be 
observed in table 3, between 1989 and 1993 investment income represented an 
average 30.28% of the annual profit after tax (and less than 20% since 1993). The 
result was remarkable when compared with other insurers, which received all or more 
than all of their profits from investment income (more below). 
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Table 3: Selected Financial Ratios for Direct Line Insurance, 1989-1995 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Average
Profit  growth 
(before tax) 
N.A. 10.99% 24.79% 19.87% 69.92% 43.40% 17.79% 31.13%
Growth of total 
expenses 
N.A. 21.09% 17.17% 28.60% 45.29% 25.24% 16.83% 25.70%
Investment 
income/profit (b/t)  
40.74% 51.65% 38.84% 40.40% 16.73% 12.85% 10.75% 30.28%
Motor policies  '000 255.5 293.0 410.7 670.2 1,254.5 1,883.9 2,200.0  995.4
Home policies  '000 81.1 114.2 164.2 205.9 273.1 523.0 725.0  298.1
Total  '000 336.6 407.2 574.9 876.1 1,527.6 2,406.9 2,925.0 1,293.5
Annual Growth N.A. 17.34% 29.17% 34.38% 42.65% 36.53% 17.71% 29.63%
Year end staff 526 643 787 1,086 1,903 2,857 2,746 1,507
Avr total 
expense/employee 
41,255 42,768 42,186 42,818 44,666 39,797 49,782 43,324
Avr total 
assets/employee 
205.32 211.51 257.81 279.83 308.46 302.91 391.59 279.63
    Source: Annual Reports, author. 
 
 According to Keynote (1997:53), long-term business, motor and travel insurance 
are the markets where traditional insures (i.e. composites) have met head on with 
competition from bank-distributed insurance (i.e. bankassurance). The life and 
pensions or long-term business is the largest market for UK-based insurance 
companies and premium income of long-term business emerging from Britain 
represents some 80% of total business (idem, p. 54). Between 1992 and 1995, UK 
premium income of long-term business rose by 3.8% whereas overseas life and 
pensions premium income rose by 23.1%. At the same time, between 1992 and 1995 
long-term insurance investments rose by 51.7% and the income that the investment 
generated went up by 39.5% (idem, p. 14). Clearly, growth for UK-based insurance 
companies is linked to developing more overseas long-term business premium income 
and continuing to invest in ordinary stocks and shares. 
 Direct Line's financial investment policy was quite different to the portfolio of 
life and general insurance companies. Direct Line's management claimed that in 
motor insurance liabilities arise very quickly and, therefore, the ups and downs of the 
stock market could not provide for good risk management. Management believed that 
equity investment "doubled" the firm's risk exposure (Peter Wood in Channon-Cox, 
1993). Nonetheless, there were more profitable investments other than government 
bonds and with less risk than equity. Therefore, this was a customer-oriented 
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company which was in a position to make money out of premium income as opposed 
to other insurance firms that required investment income to turn a profit. 
 
Redefining Market Structure 
 Prior to 1985, insurance brokers displayed premium values of different insurers 
grouped in tables and according to the underlying asset (risk) to be insured (home 
contents, motor, etc.). Customers could then compare premiums at different 
companies  and these premiums were known as the “standard rate” (The Guardian, 6I-
X-95). Direct Line's telephone distribution changed the scheme through which 
customers discovered actual quotes as brokers approached insurance companies on 
their behalf (Financial Times, 7-VIII-95). Direct Line’s quotes were made available 
over the telephone, instantly and on a stand alone basis (i.e. without reference to 
competitors as insurance brokers did). In fact, this pricing approach ended the 
existence of the “standard rate” and insurance prices started bearing closer 
resemblance to a direct-insurer’s cost structure, portfolio risk and customer’s 
characteristics. 
 But, Direct Line was not the first to by-pass brokers as a distribution channel. 
The first British firm to sell insurance directly to customers was established in 1961. 
Abbey Life aimed at combining Canadian sales techniques with more comprehensive 
and easier to understand life insurance policies (BusinessAge, 1-IX-93). Regardless of 
the opportunity, during the following 34 years composites drifted to a kind of 
wholesaler role (Lloyds List, 26-IV-95). Retailing was surrendered to independent 
intermediaries (called insurance brokers). As a result, when banks and building 
societies entered insurance as brokers or direct issuers they found that composites 
lacked the advantage of controlled, pre-established distribution channels to sell 
insurance. The eventual success of Direct Line gave the composites a technology-
based way to fight-back other financial intermediaries and recuperating some of their 
lost market share. However and as will be made evident below, technology also 
threatened the relationship between insurance firms and brokers which few 
established insurance firms were willing to change. 
 The earliest follower of Direct Line was established in 1988, in the form of a 
subsidiary of Royal Insurance called The Insurance Service. Royal Insurance gave the 
new subsidiary a distinct name from the rest of the group in order to avoid upsetting 
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brokers with whom it had a working relationship. However, Royal Insurance began 
selling personal cover directly over the telephone in 1994, using its own brand name, 
and simultaneously through The Insurance Service. The end result was that support of 
the parent's advertising benefited Royal Insurance Direct while The Insurance Service 
scored badly in recognition tests (Financial Times, 16-VIII-95). 
Table 4 illustrates the growth of other insurance companies (and banks) using 
the same technology as Direct Line to sell directly to customers in retail finance 
markets. It then becomes clear that Direct Line's innovative entry had modified core 
products and redefined the market's structure (see further Geroski, 1991:210). Further 
evidence of Direct Line’s influence on selling retail financial products emerged when, 
in the course of 1989 and 1990, 50 direct insurers were established in the UK. This 
was two years after Royal Insurance’s experience and when Direct Line’s superior 
financial performance was evident. The proliferation of direct underwriting centres in 
Britain was such that in 1994 they captured approximately 31% of the private motor 
insurance market, up from 17% in 1992 (Breaking the Mould, 16-VIII-94). 
 Many of Direct Line's followers were telesales arms of traditional insurers and 
alongside their telesales subsidiaries, many composites continued selling policies 
through brokers. Composites believed that the establishment of telesales outfits 
created conflicts with insurance brokers and with their brand image (Lloyds List, 26-
IV-95). Insurers' lack of confidence reflected doubts about mastering the new "direct" 
channel and also, the poor management of  brokers as a distribution channel. 
 In brief, one external element that allowed Direct Line to achieve competitive 
advantage had to do with the fact that composites' response to Direct Line was not 
immediate.  
 
"To be honest I didn't expect the industry to make it so easy for [Direct Line]. 
They ignored us for so long." (Peter Wood in BusinessAge, 1-IV-95).  
 
 The five year lag in the response cost insurance companies dearly in terms of 
investments to develop adequate capabilities (specially related to IT and direct 
advertisement.) However, the experience of The Insurance Service suggested that 
building these capabilities was a necessary but not sufficient condition to regain 
credibility and market share. 
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 Direct Line's strategy illustrates a case where an innovative entrant surmounted 
apparently high entry barriers by essentially changing the terms under which 
competition occurred. Direct Line's technology could be (and was) adopted by a wide 
range of firms supplying retail finance both inside and outside Britain. Telephone call 
centres opened a distribution option and one that allowed even the smallest 
competitors to challenge retail finance markets by setting-up direct sales operations 
on a variable basis. 
 
Table 4: Selection of Direct Retail Finance Intermediaries, 1986-1996  
Name Type Owner Country Est. 
Direct Line  Motor, mortgages, life Royal Bank of Scotland UK 1985 
Celtic Autoquote Motor Celtic Insurance Ireland 1988 
The Insurance Service Motor, home Royal Insurance UK 1988 
GA Direct Motor, home, personal General Accident UK 1988 
First Direct Bank Midland Bank UK 1989 
Churchill Insurance Motor, home, credit cards Wintherthur (CH) UK 1989 
Eagle Star Direct Motor Eagle Star UK 1989 
Premier Direct Bank, insurance (1994) Bank of Ireland Ireland 1990 
Royal Insurance Direct Life Royal Insurance UK 1992 
Touchline Motor General Minister UK 1992 
Admiral Insurance Motor Brockbank Group UK 1993 
Alliance Auto Direct Motor Alliance Insurance UK 1993 
Guardian Direct  Personal Guardian Royal Exchange UK 1994 
Banco 1 Bank Unibanco Brazil 1995 
Línea Directa Motor Bankinter/Direct Line Spain 1995 
Chase Direct  Bank Chase Manhattan Bank (NY) USA 1995 
Chem Direct  Bank Chemical Bank (NY) USA 1995 
Guardian Direct Motor Guardian Direct (UK) Ireland 1995 
Virgin Direct Investment funds (Peps) R Branson/Norwich Union UK 1995 
Privilege Insurance High risk motor P Wood/RBS UK 1995 
Banque Directe Bank Banque Paribas France 1995 
Norwich Union Direct Motor, home Norwich Union UK 1996 
Source: Financial Times, The Sunday Business Post, author.   
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The Innovative Applications of Direct Line 
 Alongside pricing policy and the response of competitors, another distinctive 
element that explained Direct Line's success was its innovative IT applications and 
their support to improve customer service. The three most common features 
associated with these applications were : 
 
• Interactive systems .- Contracts indexed by customer name rather than by number. 
• Fair quotes .- Relevant information to process claims and policies was retrieved 
from actual telephone conversations by queries made in a polite but precise 
manner. 
• Enhanced customer convenience .- Retrieved information was directly transferred 
into actual policy formats (if quote accepted and paid through direct debit or credit 
card). The client then foregoes the need to fill in forms or wrestle with paperwork. 
 
 These features suggests that interactive systems supported a separation of all 
pricing elements and conferred the possibility of examining the value chain from 
quote to settlement. Secondly, fair quotes produce more accurate information on the 
risk represented by type of customer profile since there is reduced risk of adverse 
selection. Thirdly, direct methods improve customer convenience and result in higher 
retention rates than other distribution methods.  
 The end result of direct operation was that Direct Line's top management did not 
need to ask anybody for information because information could be retrieved from the 
system. Any query was possible as long as it was supported by the database which 
reflects the importance and time spent on its design by Direct Line's original team.  
 At Direct Line all IT was integrated and the database stored information from all 
over the firm precisely when a transaction took place. As a consequence, Direct Line's 
managers had a direct channel to craft strategy without any of the uncertainty about 
profit drives and policy variables that generally applied. They could experience the 
effects of changes in IT or risk assessment queries on a real-time basis. Direct Line's 
strategy makes no need of middle management to process information about 
environmental conditions or strategy implementation and hence, was not subject to 
information delay or bias inherent in other situations. This de-layering of operations 
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meant that approximately 80% of the 3,000 strong workforce were involved in front-
desk operations like telesales, teleclaims or claim evaluation (Channon, 1993:10).  
 The 1988 entry into home contents insurance illustrates how the anticipated 
advantage attributed to IT systems was explored to support a diversification move. 
Building societies had an advantage in terms of previous market knowledge. To add 
to this difficulty, Direct Line inherited a sub-scale book of business from The Royal 
Bank of Scotland which had major problems of adverse selection (security properties) 
and under-valuation. For a time, claim ratios and costs at Direct Line exceeded those 
of the main competitors in the home contents insurance market. Differences in claims 
ratios and costs evidently reflected under-priced high risk and under-priced business 
rather than the standard business attracted in motor insurance (Peter Wood in 
Channon-Cox, 1993). However, even a non-optimal portfolio responded to the new 
process. Direct Line's system supported a fast learning curve which allowed managers 
to fine tune the pricing policy and, eventually, learnt how to price home contents 
insurance more accurately than building societies. In the end, home contents 
insurance proved to be another success story for Direct Line. 
 
Transferring Competencies to the Royal Bank of Scotland 
 The results of Direct Line's financial success and innovative IT applications 
became a learning experience for The Royal Bank of Scotland. The phenomenon 
roots back to the early 1980s. At the time, Peter Wood was a director at Alexander 
Howden (a UK insurance firm). There he conceived the idea for an outfit such as 
Direct Line. His employer was not interested and so he resigned.  
 
Peter Wood "...approached a number of other institutions before he made his 
way to..." The Royal Bank of Scotland (The Guardian, 25-XI-94). The people 
at The Royal "...weren't too worried about losing £20 million, more about 
losing reputation. But in the end, they just wanted to try something new so 
they backed me....The bank kept a very close watch on its new investment for 
a good five years, before a new chief executive, George Matthewson, took 
over. He quickly realised the potential of Direct Line, and was happy to let 
[me] run the show.. Now he asks me for advice on how to make money. I have 
to say: 'Sorry I'd love to, but I'm too busy'."  (Peter  Wood in BusinessAge, 1-
IV-95).  
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 One lesson from Direct Line to managers at the bank was not depending solely on 
Management Information Systems to discover new growth opportunities. Rather, 
managers must rely on having good IT and being able to apply information systems to 
pursue new growth opportunities (Senior Manager, 26-IX-96). Direct Line managers 
considered that the source of their competitive advantage could not be reduced to IT 
providing cost-effective solutions. Rather they believed that Direct Line competitive 
edge emerged from successful execution of a product market and a customer group 
diversification move within retail finance markets.  
 
DISCUSSION   
 This research illustrates how a subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Scotland called 
Direct Line Insurance captured an opportunity presented by technological change. 
This strategy seemed to offer the added benefit of greater cost efficiency. For 
managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland IT appeared to lower entry and exit barriers 
and promised high sustainability of competitive advantage. The strategic intent behind 
the case study of the Royal Bank of Scotland suggested competitive considerations 
were at a premium because unsolicited take-over bids in the early 1980s put pressure 
on managers to create growth opportunities. On balance the strategy seemed to have 
been more effectively executed in some areas than in others while cost efficiency 
through IT capabilities played a secondary role. Nevertheless, technological change 
did allow the Royal Bank of Scotland to enter other geographies and new markets. 
 Managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland seem to have developed their plans for 
strategic control in a relatively stable environment in British retail insurance markets. 
However, managers at Royal Bank of Scotland were under pressure to create several 
new growth opportunities and taken advantage of regulatory change in Western 
Europe (i.e. the Single Market in Financial Services programme).  But in spite of  
European and British regulatory changes during the 1980s and early 1990s, the main 
success of The Royal Bank of Scotland in retail financial services and a factor which 
changed the whole strategy of the bank, came not from geographical and product 
diversification strategies nor from IBOS and other international alternatives. Success 
emerged from product based diversification through a telephone-based operation in 
motor insurance. This success demonstrated new possibilities in the provision of retail 
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financial services and showed a new use of IT applications to implement banks’ 
corporate strategy.  
The Royal Bank of Scotland was primarily a low risk follower, aiming to 
deflect further unsolicited take-over bids. To The Royal's managers, the fact that 
Direct Line redefined the rules of competitive engagement would be beneficial since 
it did not create a threat to any of The Royal's potential predators.  
The subsidiary started as one of the alternative entries into bankassurance 
explored by managers of The Royal. Direct Line was established not as a product of 
The Royal's internal ingenuity since they were approached only after the founder 
failed to find finance opportunities amongst established insurers. Initially a tactical 
innovation designed to supply a limited set of retail financial services, Direct Line 
evolved to create a new distribution channel that posed a major threat to the strategies 
and market position of other financial intermediaries. This was a case where an 
innovative entrant surmounted apparently high entry barriers by essentially changing 
the terms under which competition occurred. Direct Line's characteristic technology 
and marketing provided The Royal Bank of Scotland with a swift and profitable 
penetration of the UK insurance business. Furthermore, this technology was 
successfully replicated (with the same results) in countries such as Spain and 
Germany.  
For established insurance firms, Direct Line's financial results raised the issue 
of whether core capabilities in retail insurance encompassed underwriting or 
underwriting and investment management. Increasing profitability from Direct Line's 
premium income suggested that diversification moves of other insurance companies 
into investment management (and their reliance on investment income for profits) had 
turned a core business unprofitable. Insurance companies increased the profitability of 
a previously unprofitable core business as insurance companies adopted telephone 
technology.  The technology gave insurance companies a way to fight back the entry 
of banks and building societies to retail insurance markets and the possibility to profit 
from premium writing (rather than investment income). However, it took the 
visionary strategy of Direct Line's founder rather than the previously unprofitable 
tactical entry of The Royal Bank into bankassurance, for established insurers to 
capture new growth opportunities associated with telephone sales (such as improved 
market segmentation possibilities through a new distribution channel). 
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 The unanswered issue is why Direct Line was not internationalised more quickly. 
In terms of growth opportunities there seem to be few limitations either from 
managerial diseconomies or with computer capacity. Yet Direct Line used a strategic 
alliance to penetrate the Spanish market. The alliance would suggest the possibility 
that regulatory approval and compliance were perceived as barriers to entry in spite of 
the EU Single Market reform programme.  As a result, future research on the adoption 
of technological change in financial markets (and in particular, IT applications in 
retail banking) should further explore how regulatory approval and compliance are 
barriers to enter bank markets. Moreover, how environmental change modified the 
adoption of alternative, equally effective, cost reducing, IT-based applications by 
bank managers. 
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